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Networks of greed 
 
Vincenzo Ruggiero1  
 
Abstract 
Focusing on the grey areas in which white-collar crime joins and overlaps with 
conventional forms of organised criminality, the author identifies ‘networks of 
greed’ formed of individuals and groups from diverse social backgrounds and 
subcultures. Such grey areas thrive irrespective of booms and slumps and 
contain money laundering, tax evasion and bribes. A critical analysis of these 
three forms of financial crime is provided along with the description of the 
networks within which they take place. 
 
Introduction 
 
Classifications of financial crime describe the different forms of fraudulent 
behaviour in the context of market activities. A conceptual distinction is made 
between financial statement fraud, financial scams and fraudulent financial mis-
selling (Gottschalk, 2010; Reurink, 2016). The prevalence of one form of fraud 
over the other is thought to depend on the market segment in which it occurs 
and the actors involved (Harrington, 2012). Not always do such classifications 
link the frauds perpetrated within the criminogenic environment in which they 
originate, in this way reiterating a long tradition which oscillates between 
blaming particular individuals or their victims.  
In the seventeenth century, for instance, the culprits of the ruinous 
outcomes of financial activity were identified as unscrupulous traders 
manipulating the market. The stigma, however, was also attached to ordinary 
investors, who gambled in finance while shunning honest toil and engaging in 
sinful drinking. In the eighteenth century, responsibility for financial collapse 
was laid upon employees and predatory insiders of otherwise honest 
institutions, but also imputed to fraudsters setting up phony stock companies 
overnight to then quickly run with the money in the morning. Crashes were 
accidents, like those inadvertently provoked by gentlemen running over 
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pedestrians while riding their horses (Ruggiero, 2017). Whether ineluctable 
natural events or acts of individual pathology, crises were also deemed part of 
economic growth, which needed dangerous and expensive experiments in order 
to progress. Prudence was still perceived as a virtue, but virtuous people were 
deemed lackluster individuals, devoid of charm. Conversely, transgressors were 
regarded as imprudent creators.  
As the eighteenth century drew to its close, the blame for financial 
delinquency shifted more emphatically towards its victims, namely rash and 
greedy investors (Galbraith, 1987; Kindleberger, 2002). Legislation, it was 
remarked, could not protect fools from folly. Soon after, however, unorthodox 
operators were included among the range of ‘criminaloids’, a class of individuals 
neither solidly honest nor dishonest, just imitators of wealthy people whose 
behaviour followed a cascade principle (Lombroso, 1976; 1902). The nineteenth 
century, the century of scientific examination of crime and criminals, offered 
glimpses of corrupt elites, adventurous bankers and robber barons. Later, the 
return of the ‘criminaloid’ marked the first attempts to formulate a concept of 
white-collar crime (Ross, 1907; Bonger, 1916, 1936). Criminologists identified a 
form of structural immorality and looked at financial delinquency through the 
study of managers, the morally unbound characters servicing organizations. This 
type of immorality was incorporated in Sutherland’s (1940; 1983) notion of 
differential association, according to which a person becomes delinquent 
because of an excess of definitions favourable to violation of law over definitions 
unfavourable to violation of law.  
This paper addresses financial crime from a different perspective. It focuses 
on the grey areas in which white-collar crime joins and overlaps with 
conventional forms of organised criminality, namely those areas characterized 
by ‘networks of greed’ formed of individuals and groups from diverse social 
backgrounds and subcultures who, nevertheless, adopt the same illicit 
techniques and rationalizations.  
What emerges from the perspective adopted here is the relevance of critical 
criminological concepts, which indicate that socially harmful acts transcend 
statutory definitions of crime, that power relations determine criminal 
designations and that criminalisation processes are embedded in social 
inequality.  
Financial crises, crashes and bubbles may be endemic or cyclical, they may 
follow regular or unpredictable patterns, or also be determined by intermittent 
periods of optimism or gloom. Untouched by the vagaries of markets, the grey 
areas examined here continue to thrive irrespective of booms and slumps: these 
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areas host money laundering, tax evasion and bribes. In the following pages a 
critical analysis is attempted of the three forms of financial crime, focusing on 
the characteristics of the networks within which they take place. Mathematical 
morality, mobility, hybridity and fuzziness are among the variables discussed. 
Two recent notorious cases may help throw some light on the arguments 
presented and provide the backdrop for the analysis to be formulated. 
 
Panama and Belize 
 
Case 1. The leaking of millions of documents revealed details of operations 
conducted over forty years in offshore tax havens. The Panamanian law firm 
Mossack Fonseca was at the centre of the revelations, which provided 
information about some seventy current or former heads of state and their tax 
evasion. Iceland’s Prime Minister resigned, while Vladimir Putin’s circle was 
proven to engineer unorthodox, wealth-acquisition mechanisms. 
Representatives of FIFA (the International Football Federation) were also listed 
in the documents. Mossack Fonseca, initially, claimed to be shocked by the way 
the services it offered had been abused by customers, but was also surprised 
that offshoring arrangements were so vulnerable to investigative journalism 
and, perhaps, to prosecution (Leith, 2016). British and London-based banks 
emerged among the most active customers of the Panama firm: HSBC, Coutts, 
Rothschild and UBS being among the top ten banks who set up around 15,600 
shell companies to help clients conceal their finances. HSBC had been fined £28 
million in 2015 for allowing customers to launder money in its Swiss private 
branch, while in Panama it set up more than 2,300 offshore companies. Its chief 
executive was among the customers of Mossack Fonseca, which concealed his 
pay and dealt with his tax affairs. Coutts, the private arm of publicly-owned 
Royal Bank of Scotland, set up 500 paper companies through its Jersey agency. 
UBS, the Swiss group with most of its investment banking operations in the City 
of London, set up more than 1,300 offshore companies. The Luxembourg 
International Bank was involved through Experta, which offers corporate and 
trust services, while other British-based institutions included Credit Swiss 
Channel Island and Rothschild Trust Guernsey (Goodway, 2016).  
The Panamanian firm also laundered money derived from notorious bank 
robberies and other organized criminal activities. Fonseca’s customers avoided 
paying tax by hiring Bahamas residents as fronts. UK Prime Minister David 
Cameron and his father Ian appeared in the leaked papers, along with six 
members of the House of Lords, three former Conservative Members of 
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Parliament and dozens of donors to UK parties. Ian Cameron was a director of 
an investment fund named (how ironic!) Blairmore Holding Inc, which had 
among its customers an adviser of Robert Maxwell and the Rolling Stones. In 
thirty years, Blairmore never paid a penny of tax in the UK on its profits (Garside, 
2016).  
The British Virgin Islands continued to licence Mossack Fonseca despite 
knowing the firm was unable to establish who owned the companies on its 
books, while a British banker set up a secret offshore finance company allegedly 
used by North Korean leaders to assist in arms sales and the expansion of its 
nuclear weapon programme. The revelations also affected Ukraine’s president 
Poroshenko, who was elected in 2014, in the aftermath of the political upheaval 
in the country that led to the annexation of Crimea and open conflict with 
Russia. While the war was taking place, Poroshenko moved his assets into an 
offshore company in the British Virgin Islands. The leaks also contained 
information about how some leaders from a number of countries used 
charitable foundations and other firms registered in Panama to anonymously 
own mining companies and real estate (Schmidt and Lee Myers, 2016). 
Case 2. One of the oldest banks in Central America was established in 1902 
in what was then British Honduras, now known as Belize. The bank operated as 
a branch of the Royal Bank of Canada and traded extensively across the 
Caribbean region. In 1987, Belize Bank International (BBI) was bought by 
Michael Ashcroft, the son of a British colonial administrator, who advised the 
local government on how to turn the country into an offshore financial centre. 
After being granted a thirty-year special tax break, the bank attracted liquidity 
from all over the world (Bowers, 2016). A major investigation by US authorities 
is underway, aimed at ascertaining whether the bank was, and still is, used by 
US citizens to hide assets and evade tax. Because the Belize Bank International 
may not know which accounts are owned by US persons, it may be forced to 
disclose all its clients, irrespective of nationality. Like all offshore banks, BBI 
operates through correspondent financial institutions, based in the US and 
elsewhere, that provide services and process transactions. If the accounts in 
correspondent institutions are shut off, the offshore bank is out of business and 
all customers’ deposits are frozen. Among the correspondent institution linked 
to BBI are Citibank and Bank of America. According to the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the investigation resulted in the loss of correspondent 
banking relationships, causing destabilizing effects on the financial and 
economic stability in the Caribbean region. In response, Prime Minister of Belize, 
Dean Barrow, proposed that the region could establish its own banks in the US 
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and establish correspondent relationships with them. Alternatively, the banks 
of the region, through mergers, would have to achieve a critical mass to make 
the Caribbean’s banking industry more attractive to financial institutions in the 
US and across the world (Ramos, 2016). This is an investigation that is highly 
embarrassing for the UK government as the bank is owned by a former deputy 
chair of the Conservative party and one of its most generous donors. 
Investigators are basing their work on a voluminous file composed over the last 
ten years which lists, among the bank’s customers, tax dodgers and members of 
transnational criminal organizations (ibid).   
 
Illicit finance 
 
Tax evasion, bribes and money laundering are intertwined in the cases reported 
above, a circumstance suggesting that canonical distinctions between white-
collar and organized criminals should, to say the least, be revised. The 
distinction, however, has severe implications for the institutional responses 
commonly addressed to both. Let us see why. 
The fight against illicit finance is shaped by its very origin, namely by its 
polarized concern towards funds deriving from conventional criminal activity. In 
the popular imaginary, but also in official rhetoric, is it not easy to dissociate 
money laundering from the war on drugs, with the result that the fight against 
dirty finance continues to convey an image of clean but vulnerable financial 
institutions being soiled by contaminating criminal attacks. The ambiguity of this 
image is compounded by official efforts to curb the monetary operations 
conducted by terrorist groups, which are increasingly described as violent 
entrepreneurs rather than religious or political combatants.  
In contrast to popular or official rhetoric, a growing number of cases like the 
ones presented above fall into the realm of corruption and tax evasion rather 
than in that of organized crime and terrorism, suggesting a proliferation of 
money-laundering strategies that can respond to differentiated demand. White-
collar and organized criminals, in brief, inhabit the same arena in which illicit 
financial operations are carried out (Platt, 2015; Ruggiero, 2017). 
There are professional money launderers whose number and range of 
customers is unknown. There are members of organized criminal groups who 
stay away from financial institutions and opt to invest their proceeds in further 
illegal activity or in mere consumption, not necessarily conspicuous. Moreover, 
the findings of some specific research on money from drugs disprove the 
transnational nature of the laundering process, which appears mainly to remain 
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a local endeavour (van Duyne and Levi, 2005). When criminal profits are inserted 
into the official economy, for example in the construction sector or through the 
acquisition of real estate, fronts unrelated to the illegal underground are used, 
including businesses experiencing difficulties. Such businesses may ultimately 
be appropriated by criminal groups as their original owners become insolvent 
and, at the same time, subject to blackmail threats. A portion of criminal 
proceeds, on the other hand, finds its way into the bank accounts of accomplices 
in the economic sphere as well as in political circles, so that the task of 
laundering is entrusted to official actors who are normally more successful in 
such operations. In this way, it becomes nearly impossible to ascertain whether 
the funds being laundered originate from organised criminal activities or from 
corrupt economic and political initiatives.  
Intermediary figures in the financial world offer services to a range of 
customers, from the underworld as well as the upperworld. Their ability consists 
in accelerating the mobility of money rather than assessing their origin, also 
because they, in turn, may interact with other intermediaries linked in a 
relatively long and tangled chain. Lawyers and accountants are components of 
this chain and often act as ‘enablers’, whether in an active or passive fashion 
(Middleton and Levi, 2015). The source of the funds being laundered tends 
therefore to fade in a vortex of moves that protects deals and transactions: 
mobility means that the culpable are never found on the crime scene. This 
characteristic, which is commonly attributed to white-collar criminals, may well 
denote the operations of conventional criminals in the financial world. 
Officially triggered by the urge to fight drug traffickers and seize their profits, 
anti-money-laundering measures, while criticized for obstructing business (Gill 
and Taylor, 2004), have proved unable to separate the revenues of organized 
crime from those of white-collar offenders. Such measures, perhaps unwittingly, 
encouraged in fact the connubial unification of the two. As a result, the 
traditional caution, uncertainty, timidity and fear in dealing with white-collar 
offenders may well extend to the treatment of conventional criminals, as money 
laundering, perpetrated by indistinct actors, is one of the few activities ‘that 
connect Al Qaeda, Colombian drug dealers, Credit Suisse, and Enron officers’ 
(Levi, 2014: 439). In brief, the effects of this specific kind of financial crime are 
not confined to the business sphere, but spread to the criminal business world, 
exerting a tantalizing attraction on illicit entrepreneurs. It is a type of financial 
delinquency that provides motivations for, enables, or even indirectly ‘creates’ 
other types of delinquency. The following are some elements of this process. 
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Furtive money 
 
Tax evasion and money laundering share a set of techniques and are carried out 
through the mediatory role of similar, if not identical, financial operators. Surely, 
they may entail distinct processes: for instance, the former aims at hiding the 
existence of legally earned profits, therefore at making it illegal. The latter, on 
the contrary, involves the transformation of illegally earned profits into legally 
acquired earnings (UNODCCP, 1998). Tax evasion, in sum, has to minimize the 
financial success of those performing it, while money laundering has to 
maximize the sums officially presented as legitimate earnings. It is commonly 
assumed that the major actors involved are, respectively, legitimate 
entrepreneurs (tax evasion) and organized crime groups (money laundering), 
although the former too often find it necessary to hide not just their legitimate, 
but also their illegitimate earnings. This is the case when they have to disguise 
or hide money given or received as bribes or kickbacks, or in general when the 
money spent or earned is associated with illegal market practices. States may 
also perform money-laundering operations, when they hide financial 
transactions associated with illegal political practices at the international level 
(the clandestine financing of friendly parties or allied ruling elites abroad) 
(Ruggiero, 2015a). 
Conventionally divided into three stages, the laundering of money entails, 
first, the removal of the illicitly-earned profits from the place these have been 
acquired; second, their layering, namely a series of transactions which conceal 
their origin; third, their integration in the legitimate financial channels. Virtual 
banking makes such operations easier than before, offering the opportunity to 
open anonymous accounts and establish shell business entities. Offshore trusts 
and companies may act as vehicles through which the funds are moved before 
reaching the major financial centres.  
Regarded as a tabloid-like description of money laundering, the three-staged 
model has been critically re-examined in its distinct components. The removal 
of illicitly-earned profits and their ‘placement’ in the financial system, it is noted, 
ignores the fact that often the money involved is already in the system when 
the crime is committed. Insider dealing, illegal payments for contracts, bribes 
and kickbacks involving politicians and business are examples of how those 
benefiting from crime find their profits already safely ‘placed’ in financial circles. 
As for the stage of ‘layering’, the assumption that a long series of complex 
transactions guarantees the proper ‘cleaning’ of dirty money neglects how 
simplicity may also offer an effective service (see the cases above). Finally, 
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‘integration’, which is supposed to allow criminals to enjoy the proceeds of their 
acts, overlooks the reality that this stage is frequently indistinguishable from the 
activity preceding it. In brief, it should be reiterated that the three-staged model 
may apply to conventional criminal activities such as drugs trafficking, which 
typically is a cash-generating crime, but it is inadequate when faced with non-
cash generative crimes, ‘such as bribery, tax evasion, market manipulation, and 
cyber-crime – crimes which have become much more prevalent since anti-
money laundering guidance was first issued over twenty years ago’ (Platt, 2015: 
27). 
Money-laundering legislation across the world, originally designed to fight 
organized crime, can therefore end up encouraging it. Such legislation revolves 
around the notion of ‘suspicion’, whereby financial institutions are required to 
adopt a risk-based approach in judging the honesty of their customers and 
report suspected money launderers to the authorities. The finance industry, 
however, offers criminals a chance to achieve all aims they deem desirable: 
success in the perpetration of a crime, avoidance of detection, benefit from the 
crime and retention of it. The process is informed by a number of different 
‘disconnects’ (Platt, 2015: 30). First, the beneficiaries of the crime are 
disconnected from the act committed if they create a company administered 
and controlled by a firm. Second, they can transform the cash acquired into 
costly goods. Third, they can disconnect from the property purchased if they set 
up a trust company, so that the trustees become the official owners of those 
properties. Some specific financial services empower criminals to achieve yet 
further disconnects. These include: 
 
• foundations, officially devoted to charitable purposes, which can 
manage money from ‘donors’; 
• correspondent accounts, which are kept by one bank on behalf of 
another and can be used by customers to transfer money in foreign 
currency; 
• shell banks, which hold licences in poorly regulated financial centres; 
• loans, which can be repaid using illegal proceeds;  
• investment funds, whose ownership may not be registered and can 
be redeemed to a third party;  
• letters of credit, which are used to ‘grease the wheels’ of 
international trade and facilitate money laundering, for example, 
through over invoicing (overstating the price of the goods bought and 
sold as a means of transferring funds); 
• private banks, which offer total discretion. 
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Mobility and crime 
 
A key variable recurs in the study of conventional organized crime, namely 
‘mobility’, a variable which is also crucial for an understanding of financial crime 
committed by white-collar offenders. In the fight against criminal organizations, 
‘mobility’ is associated to the ability of offenders to shift from illicit to licit 
business and enforcement efforts are concentrated on the channels making 
such a shift smooth. Severing the links between criminal and official 
entrepreneurs is of paramount importance for this fight, which includes the 
severance of the links granting criminal proceeds access to the financial world. 
In the case of white-collar offenders operating in finance, however, severing the 
links between legitimate and illegitimate practices may be harder, for the 
reasons tentatively explicated below.  
The old ‘fraud triangle’ posited by Cressey (1950), which identified 
opportunities, motivations and rationalizations as the enabling factors of white-
collar criminality, may well be inadequate for the explanation of contemporary 
financial delinquency. Granted, tax evasion, corruption and money laundering 
are performed in local or global contexts in which opportunities for hiding one’s 
resources abound, and where the skills of facilitators may make investigation 
hard. In general, fraudsters may be motivated in their action by the decreasing 
availability of legal opportunities, or by a system of rewards based on what is 
achieved rather than how. The acts performed by fraudsters, moreover, may 
intensify and expand when social and institutional responses are hesitant or 
non-existent. Intense pressure in organizations is often cited as a crucial catalyst 
for fraudulent conduct, although it has also been hypothesized that the 
enactment of such conduct is hampered by ‘a fraud-inhibiting inner voice’ 
(Schuchter and Levi, 2015). Furthermore, research on offenders convicted for 
financial statement fraud, corruption, bribery, embezzlement and accounting 
fraud appears to reveal a lack of rationalization, but rather a ‘guilty conscience 
after the crime’ (ibid: 184). Contrition after the crime, however, may be the 
supreme form of manipulation by offenders aimed at tempering the indignation 
meted out to them, and often does not guarantee desistence from reoffending. 
Again, a parallel can be drawn with conventional organized crime, when 
members of mafia-like structures become turncoats only to eliminate 
competitors and continue, or even escalate, their criminal career (Dino, 2006). 
Rationalisations of tax evasion, bribes and money laundering often revolve 
around the ‘iniquitous’ nature of the state and its invasive fiscal policies. They 
are fed by the belief that wealth must freely circulate in order to reproduce 
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itself, and that taxation aimed at funding collective welfare exacerbates the 
unwillingness of the beneficiaries to fend for themselves through enterprising 
efforts. Pressure, in its turn, does not only derive from precise organizations or 
professional enclaves, but also from the general political culture, whereby large-
scale offences are tolerated if small-scale ones are treated benignly, in a process 
leading to the mutual acceptance between different social groups. In this way, 
the degree of harm respectively caused, which is incommensurable, becomes 
symbolically equal: those committing small illegalities condone those 
committing large ones. ‘Condemning the condemners’ turns into ‘condoning the 
condoners’ (Ruggiero, 2000: 122). 
Mobility is a crucial variable for the understanding of the types of financial 
criminality examined here. This variable describes the privileges enjoyed by 
offenders as well as the object of their offending. Financial offenders are the 
real ‘sans-papiers’, as they can freely circulate, undocumented, and cross any 
border, with the purpose of hiding and valorizing their money. Disadvantage, by 
contrast, amounts to immobility, namely lack of possibilities to establish 
geographical and social links. It is this polarization, this substantial asymmetry 
that creates a climate conducive to tax evasion and money laundering. Wealth 
includes the ability to multiply one’s affiliations and access a variety of social 
worlds, and is fostered by the resulting expansion of choices offered to mobile 
individuals and groups. A polarized distribution of mobility means drastic 
limitations for some, whose efforts to form links and multiply affiliations are 
impeded. And this impediment is one of the most significant aspects of what we 
call social exclusion. Mobile individuals and groups, on the contrary, develop 
opportunities by expanding the circle in which they operate, by entering other 
circles which intersect with yet others, in a geometrical progression leading to 
increasing and ever new possibilities.  
Inequality, in brief, lies in differences in mobility, hence the power of 
financial markets and operators: funds are moved at a pace that is unimaginable 
to other economic spheres, let alone other social groups. Finance and its crimes 
are embedded in an insatiable process which is portrayed as natural, implying 
that people themselves are naturally and categorically insatiable (Boltanski and 
Chiapello, 2005). Insatiability, in turn, borders on crime, and legitimate and 
illegitimate practices, for this reason, are adjacent, in a continuum which is hard 
to sever.  
 
  
NETWORKS OF GREED      13 
 
VOLUME 1, NUMBER 1. 
Mathematical morality  
 
Money laundering is going viral, an epidemiological metaphor suggesting that a 
number of financial corrupt practices are amalgamated and meshed in hidden 
operational circuits where actors from diverse backgrounds meet and 
cooperate. Looking at what I would term the universe of money laundering as 
network, a peculiar operational logic comes to light.  
Financial institutions and money launderers are two entities involved in a 
game and, let us assume, represent two sets of interests. They are both 
intelligent and try to outmaneuver each other through choices determined by 
expected rewards. Money launderers will acquire confidence and even temerity 
if the payoffs and losses produced by their action are not only acceptable, but 
desirable. Their behaviour, in sum, is not dictated by law or ethics, but is inspired 
by a form of mathematical morality associated with the maximum outcomes the 
game can yield. Applied to military affairs, this ‘theory of games of strategy’ 
analyses choice under a system of rewards, with participants who are aware of 
potential winnings and losses (Williams, 1954). Financial institutions and money 
launderers, for example, are aware of this zero-sum game, and while bearing in 
mind the game matrix, namely the rewards and penalties, would normally act 
with a certain degree of prudence. Supposing the two players pursue 
antithetical goals, they will be satisfied when both obtain the maximum 
outcome from their choices. According to this theory, when this is achieved, the 
game is said to have reached a saddle-point, and when the players depart from 
this point they may suffer unnecessary loss, the situation becomes fluid and 
someone, anyway, will ultimately suffer.  
We can argue that the incorporation of diverse forms of financial 
delinquency within money laundering as network has achieved a saddle-point, 
allowing all actors involved to obtain the maximum benefit they can achieve 
within that specific organizational setting. Corrupt officials, organized criminals 
and financial institutions, in brief, all achieve satisfying results in the network. 
Of course, some detection will be successful, some charges will be pressed, 
some bankers or drug traffickers will be punished, but the network as a whole 
will have achieved what could reasonably and rationally be achieved under the 
given circumstances. Surely, the apotheosis of accumulation is the final goal and 
this requires the participation of many operators, irrespective of ethnicity, social 
origin, occupation and culture: all have to turn their action into capital, or even 
‘become’ capital.  
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As in all networks, in money laundering people act together to accomplish 
some desired aim, and they can do so through carefully designed strategies or 
improvisation, although theirs must always be a coordinated effort 
(Czarniawska, 2008; Hatch, 2011). In this sense, money laundering appears to 
be composed of parts and elements (criminals, lawyers, bankers, politicians and 
entrepreneurs) whose interactions produce outcomes that transcend their 
specific role and characteristics. ‘In other words, a system has properties that 
cannot be fully known by examining its parts in isolation’ (Hatch, 2011: 14). The 
interactions between the different parties change their singular culture, 
creating a group identity of varying strength, connecting them through 
practices, experiences and symbols. It is the opening of cultures to each other 
that produces change in the network, giving rise to the phenomenon of 
‘emergence’, namely a set of values which cannot be traced back to the original 
values held by the components of that organization. 
Financial crime, here, becomes a kind of administrative behaviour, where 
decision-making is based on intelligence, design and choice. Alternatives and 
consequences may be partly unknown, means and ends poorly differentiated, 
but some choices are more likely than others to approximate the desired result. 
Working procedures, however, will sooner or later take shape as the most 
effective way to achieve goals, and these procedures will be based on decisions 
that participants in the network would not make in their personal life. In a 
‘Weberian’ fashion, decisions will become impersonal, as they possess validity 
only in relation to the survival and perpetuation of the network itself, rather 
than merely that of its constituents (Weber, 1978). Ultimately, money 
laundering, as administrative behaviour, requires a form of loyalty, whereby the 
perpetrators replace their own aims with the general objectives of the network 
to which they belong.  
 
Networks and hybridity 
 
The above description postulates a configuration that has attracted intense 
analytical effort. I am thinking of criminological investigation into networks, 
which reveals contacts, interactions, cultural proximity and operational 
partnerships among constituents. Participation in networks does not exclude 
membership in more structured organizations, but may provide added value in 
terms of information, mutual aid and criminal opportunities. Research has 
unearthed networks of drug dealers, identifying core participants and 
peripheral agents, but also discovering a degree of fluidity leading participants 
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to avoid fixed roles and tasks. Research has also helped clarify how networks 
affect criminal careers, produce leaderships and adapt to changing markets and 
law enforcement (Natarajan, 2006; Morselli, 2009). When applied to 
conventional criminality, network analysis, although at times describing 
ephemeral or fluid connections, nevertheless depicts relationships among 
relatively homogenous individuals who are bound together by specific 
subcultural ties. Similarly, when applied to corporate behaviour, it focuses on 
interpersonal relationships among influential actors and the way in which norms 
are forged through interactions between business leaders (Bichler, Schoepfer 
and Bush, 2015).  
In financial crime, however, networks are better understood as informal 
assemblages made up of ties and nodes through which information is 
transmitted, knowledge is transferred, ideas are exchanged and constant 
innovation is produced. What prevails in them is a philosophy motivating a 
praxis, rather than a culture shaping a life-style. Such networks are 
characterized by a degree of openness and by loose ties, which may lower trust 
but increase innovation thanks to the diversity of those involved. While most 
criminological analysis of networks depicts crystallized configurations or 
compartmentalized entities, similar analysis applied to the financial world faces 
open, chaotic and unformed interactions. Those operating in financial 
delinquent networks enjoy a plurality of memberships and connections and a 
form of multi-positionality.  
They concentrate power, in the sense that the power each person can draw 
from membership in a specific entity is multiplied, both through multiple 
memberships and through the personal relationships that ensue (Boltanski, 
2014: 251). 
The concepts of ‘criminal social capital’ and ‘criminally exploitable ties’, in 
this respect, can provide additional elements to the analysis (McCarthy and 
Hagan, 2001; von Lampe, 2016), as they hint at potential resources that can be 
mobilized in order to enhance the possibility of success and the prediction of 
outcomes. Some qualifications are necessary, however, particularly in respect 
of the different identities of those providing such capital and ties.  
Money from organized criminal activity, bribes and tax evasion flows in the 
same pool, in networks that gather individuals from a variety of social and 
occupational backgrounds. Financial networks imply the existence of consortia 
of highly heterogeneous groups and individuals, each with a distinctive goal and 
culture, who may establish common goals on an occasional or long-term basis. 
Actors operating in them are socially ‘fuzzy’, in the sense that their exploits and 
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careers overlap with those of others who are apparently radically different from 
them. Financial networks are the reflection of grey areas hosting diverse 
cultures, identities and motivations, areas in which different activities are 
carried out, strategies take shape, common interests and points of contact 
emerge between licit, semi-licit and overtly illicit economies. These are ‘dirty 
economies’ consisting of encounters which add to the respective cultural, social 
and symbolic capital possessed by those inhabiting them, who interlock their 
practices.  
Typically heterogeneous in nature, financial networks provide ‘the strength 
of weak ties’ by following the model of a matrix, where each actor is connected 
to two key partners: one who will help enact the specific operation at hand, the 
other who will provide the general skills irrespective of the specific operation to 
be carried out. This model, which is common in engineering, design, and 
consulting firms, adapts well to changing environments and allows operations 
to be started and completed with the involvement of a limited number of 
persons (Hatch and Cunliffe, 2006). Fast and flexible, the matrix model does not 
require any substantial change in the overall structure of (in our case) the 
financial institution, and projects can be carried out in isolation from one 
another, although through an identical philosophical praxis. 
Money laundering as network brings to mind the idea of hybridity, namely 
the mixing, morphing and mimicking that stretch identities and breach 
boundaries: [H]ybridity is a kind of constant of human interaction and group 
formation, a meta-datum of what happens through countless crossover 
processes occurring at many different levels and across the ages’ (McLennan, 
2016: 151).  
Hybrids hosting criminals of all social backgrounds, financial institutions 
involved in money laundering are particularly resilient, as they absorb anomalies 
and disturbances, and while undergoing change they retain the same function. 
Adaptable, they shift notions of risk and responsibility while incorporating new 
actors and their subculture (DeVerteuil and Golubchikov, 2016). In the 
speculative philosophy of Whitehead (1978) we find a constant effort to grasp 
these ideas of hybridity, resilience, persistence and change. For him, stability 
and innovation, permanence and flux, are mutually implicated, in a process of 
reciprocal contamination. A symbiosis is reached when different social groups 
and institutions connect, shift their allegiances and establish new coalitions 
through negotiation (Schwanen, 2016).  
 
  
NETWORKS OF GREED      17 
 
VOLUME 1, NUMBER 1. 
Fields and fuzziness 
 
Conceptual tools such as field and habitus (Bourdieu, 1990; 1993) have slowly 
entered the criminological arena, offering new perspectives and, at least 
potentially, a refinement of network analysis (Fleetwood, 2014; Shammas and 
Sandberg, 2016). As spheres of social action, fields are domains in which actors 
vie for resources and ultimately domination. They possess their own internal 
logic that, nevertheless, may be altered thanks to the interactions taking place 
within them. Agonistic in nature, fields witness battles among individuals and 
groups acting within their specific boundaries. Such boundaries, however, fail to 
prevent access to external entities because they ‘are themselves an object of 
struggle, in part determining the degree of autonomy possessed by the field’ 
(Shammas and Sandberg, 2016: 202). The struggle, in its turn, may designate the 
positions of dominance or subordination actors occupy in the field. By contrast, 
in the financial crimes addressed here, none of the individuals and groups 
involved are dominant or subordinate, rather, they act in unison regardless of 
their specific ‘habitus’, namely the respective dispositions and the cognitive 
structures shaped by their social condition (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992).  
In brief, developments in the financial world may shape new fields and 
dispositions, but can hardly lead to agonistic configurations. The struggles taking 
place in finance tend to be neutralized by its being set up as a modern 
bureaucracy, which makes the employees’ definitions of their role uncertain and 
fuzzy. The separation between units, tasks and specializations tends to fragment 
responsibility, with employees ignoring (or choosing to ignore) how their duties 
relate to the general goals of their employers. ‘Employees who question the 
ethical or legal implications of their work are told to carry out their duties and 
not to worry about things that are the responsibility of top management’ 
(Coleman, 2006: 213). 
In the case of money laundering as network, therefore, what has to be 
appreciated is the progressive expansion of the ‘field’: it is the mere 
bureaucratic growth of organizations and the multiplication of their members 
and customers that play a crucial role. This growth causes an increase in 
practices and experiences within organizations, along with the possible 
subjective interpretations of rules and procedures guiding them. As a result, and 
in order to avoid decline in performance, financial institutions are forced to step 
up coordination and reduce ambiguity (Davidson Reynolds, 2016: 7). This can be 
done through the introduction of new and more detailed rules, which will create 
yet more ambiguity and offer increased opportunity for violations. So, the 
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germination of new rules and procedures, which supposedly brings new and 
more robust formalization, in fact causes an expansion of grey areas where 
diverse actors can conduct deviant experiments. The ‘fields’ of finance, 
ultimately, tend to develop into borderless prairies. 
The types of financial crime examined in this article show how two main 
conceptions of ‘status structure’ can simultaneously be in place. The elitist 
conception seems to apply to the upper layers of the financial world, where all 
factors that define an individual’s status are positively correlated and all highly 
valued characteristics coexist. In this case, the components of the financial 
world are arranged in a hierarchy. The pluralistic conception, on the other hand, 
seems to describe a situation in which power centres are numerous, and those 
wielding power are prepared to negotiate among themselves: financiers, 
politicians, entrepreneurs and criminals are all invited to the negotiating table. 
 
Conclusion 
 
No other sector of the economy is as hybrid as the financial sector, which is 
diverse, inclusive and heterogeneous. In finance, boundaries are eroded, 
polarities collapse, identities mix and a diversity of lifestyles and subcultures are 
promiscuously pitched together. In this paper, white-collar and organized 
criminals operating in the financial world have been described as agents 
adopting the same illegal techniques and rationalizations.  
A report by the Tax Justice Network recorded a sharp increase in capital 
flowing offshore in 2016, a flow promoted by an assemblage of characters such 
as tax evaders, kleptocrats and conventional criminals (Stewart, 2016). The 
increase may be the outcome of the timid regulatory measures introduced in 
the aftermath of the 2008 crisis, with financial operators directing their trade 
towards shadow institutions, thus implementing what is known as ‘regulatory 
arbitrage’, through which financial business is relocated to more favourable 
geographic areas (Ruggiero, 2015b). This type of ‘arbitrage’, as I have argued in 
the pages above, finds in money laundering a natural extension, an expanding 
network of greed that, while locating crime in favourable geographic regions, 
incorporates criminals from diverse subcultures and with contrasting CVs. 
In marketing theory, ‘convenience’ refers to the saving of time and effort to 
reach a goal (Farquhar and Rowley, 2009). In the financial arena it could be 
understood as a shortcut to profits unhampered by detection and punishment 
(Yeager, 2016). Financial crime becomes ‘convenient’ when gains overtake 
costs, therefore when time and effort are minimized while the goal of acquiring 
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illegitimate profit is reached. If it is not surprising that variables used in 
commercial strategy also apply to criminal choice (Ruggiero, 2013), it should be 
stressed that the arena of money laundering makes the distinction between the 
two redundant. Commerce and crime co-habit in money laundering as network, 
where all are well received, and where white-collar criminals have long acted as 
‘vanguards’, luring conventional criminals into their circles. In these circles, 
everyone gains instrumentally valuable bits of knowledge (de Bruin, 2015), be 
they financial operators, tax evaders, corrupt politicians, official entrepreneurs 
or members of conventional criminal groups. The resulting fuzzy and hybrid 
actors, in the networks thus constituted, acquire what Bourdieu (2012) would 
describe as logical conformity, referring to shared views, and moral conformity, 
referring to shared values. 
The study of financial crime is a panacea for critical criminology. First, it 
allows us to shift the analytical focus from crime as a result of marginalized 
conditions to crime as the result of affluence and power. In doing so, it 
encourages the formulation of alternative etiologies that run counter to the 
conventional wisdom that crime is caused by a social or psychological deficit. 
Second, it paves the way for the exploration of conduct which is harmful but not 
criminalized. In this sense, the study of financial crime amounts to the study of 
the philosophies underpinning economic activity and the institutional policies 
accompanying it. A crucial, critical aspect of this study, in sum, resides in its 
transcending the conventional confines of criminological analysis and accessing 
other fields of knowledge. Third, when prevention of financial crime is 
addressed, scholars are forced to re-visit notions of social change and collective 
action that form a large part of classical and contemporary sociological thought. 
Such notions have been expelled from criminological reasoning as a 
consequence of conventional criminologists striving for the ‘independence’ of 
their discipline. Their re-vitalization will be beneficial to critical analysis. While 
paying particular attention to preventative and regulatory measures, critical 
criminology addressing financial crime is compelled to examine (and at times 
make alliances with) the strategies of groups fighting against it. 
Traditional popular culture offers numerous examples of how difficult it is to 
distinguish between those who accumulate wealth legitimately and those who 
do so illegitimately. Cervantes (1952) is never sure whether his characters 
epitomize entrepreneurship or fraud. The heroes of many popular songs possess 
such fuzzy features that one is never certain whether theirs is a form of criminal 
honesty or law-abiding criminality. Such popular traditions may provide the 
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ideal backdrop for critical criminologists to explain and challenge financial 
delinquency. 
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